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The US patent system is often thought to
play a vital role in promoting innovation
and spurring economic growth. Indeed,
that is the primary utilitarian justification
that animates US patent law. In recent
years, however, scholars have debated
whether the contemporary patent system
impedes rather than promotes innovation
and is thus in need of fundamental
reform (e.g., Jaffe and Lemer 2004;
Burk and Lemley 2009). Responding to
interest-group lobbying, Congress, too,
has considered major changes to the
patent system for several years, even
though it has not yet enacted any in light
of significant disagreement about the
effect of proposed reforms. In PATENT
FAILURE: HOW JUDGES,
BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS
PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK, authors
James Bessen and Michael J. Meurer
argue that too much of the contemporary
patent reform debate is based on
anecdote, rhetoric, and idealized
assumptions about how patents actually
work rather than on sound data.
PATENT FAILURE is an ambitious and
challenging book that seeks to change all
that by marshalling an impressive array
of empirical data on the US patent
system to inform issues of patent law
and policy. Bessen and Meurer agree
with critics that the US patent system is
broken, and the main goal of PATENT
FAILURE is to demonstrate how and

why this is so and to propose directions
for patent system reform.
The opening chapter presents an
overview and summary of the book's
main arguments, which is particularly
helpful given both the complexities of
patent law and the extensive amount of
data analyzed in the book (which is
intended for a general audience). The
next section of PATENT FAILURE
(chapters 2-4) lays the groundwork for
Bessen and Meurer's central thesis that
patents fail to "work as property." By
this, the authors mean that patents, a
type of "intellectual property" that
protect rights in intangibles, fare badly
when compared with private property
systems that protect tangibles (such as
land) -with deleterious economic
consequences. Specifically, the
contemporary patent system fails to
provide adequate notice of the legal
rights patents confer, so that patent
owners and potential infringers alike
often cannot readily ascertain who owns
what rights - a degree of legal
uncertainty Bessen and Meurer argue
would be intolerable in a system of
tangible property rights. This "notice
failure" (the inability to provide
predictable property rights) undermines
the economic utility of patents and
therefore the effectiveness of the US
patent system (pp.53-54).
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Bessen and Meurer critique some of the
main legal doctrines and institutional
practices that have weakened the notice
function of patents and exacerbated
patent system uncertainty since the
1980s. The targets of their criticism
include the Patent and Trademark Office
(the "PTO"), the administrative agency
that examines applications and issues
patents, and the US Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit ("Federal Circuit"),
which since 1982 is the centralized
appellate court for all patent litigation
(Abramson 2007). Bessen and Meurer
criticize the PTO for allowing vague
patent claims to issue, which are
subsequently enforced by the courts
(pp.57-58). They are also critical of the
practice of filing so-called
"continuation" patent claims, which
allow inventors to "hide" modifications
to pending (and even published)
applications and thus to delay public
awareness of exactly what inventors
claim as their property right - a practice
that has grown seven-fold since 1984
(pp.62-63). Bessen and Meurer fault the
Federal Circuit for failing to develop
workable guidelines to assist lower
courts in interpreting the meaning and
scope of patent claims and for
employing a de novo standard of review
for claim interpretation on appeal.
These practices prevent a definitive
ruling on the meaning of patent claim
language until a late stage in litigation,
thus prolonging uncertainty as to what
the relevant legal rights at issue are. The
Federal Circuit and many district courts
also are to blame, the authors contend,
for unduly expanding patent owners'
rights by increasingly interpreting
abstract patent claims very broadly,
particularly in the areas of software and
"business-method" patents (pp.64-68).
All of these problems, along with the
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sheer "flood" of patent applications
(which have more than tripled since the
1990s) weaken patent notice and thereby
increase costs and uncertainty in the
patent system (pp.68-7 1).
Chapter 4 of PATENT FAILURE
explores further the authors' argument
that patents fail to work as property by
comparing the relative effects of tangible
property rights and patent rights on
economic growth. This chapter is based
on an extensive review of a by-now very
substantial literature - including
economic history, comparative
econometric studies, and natural
economic experiments. Surveying and
synthesizing this literature, Bessen and
Meurer highlight various ways that,
when compared with systems of tangible
property, patents do not necessarily
provide the level of economic benefit
they are often assumed to generate.
Having thus made the argument that
patents do not always promote economic
development, as is often assumed, in
Chapters 5 and 6 Bessen and Meurer
creatively estimate the benefits and costs
(primarily the tremendous costs of patent
litigation, which have exploded since the
mid- 1990s) respectively of patent
ownership from the 1970s to the present.
These chapters are based on an
impressive synthesis of empirical data,
including the authors' own previous
studies, on US public companies. The
findings are striking. Perhaps the most
important conclusion presented is that
the benefits of patent ownership vary
dramatically between industries. Indeed,
the authors conclude that since the 1990s
it is only in the chemical and
pharmaceutical industries that the
benefits of patent ownership clearly
outweigh the costs (p. 140). For most

other industries, particularly high-tech
and computer and soRware companies,
patents act as a disincentive to
innovation (p.141-46).
The next several chapters further explore
how and why the US patent system's
failures are best understood as resulting
from the historically recent, but
increasing, deterioration of patent notice.
Chapter 7 evaluates potential alternative
explanations for the decline of the patent
system, such as increasing business-tobusiness litigiousness, the rise of patent
"trolls" - who enforce patents but do not
manufacture or commercialize any
products - or the supposed decline in
patent examination quality in the PTO.
Bessen and Meurer conclude that patent
notice decline is the strongest
explanation that comports with the
empirical evidence. Chapter 8 details
particular notice problems that affect
small companies. And Chapter 9
focuses on the specific - and acute notice problems associated with abstract
software and business methods patents.
The substantial contribution of PATENT
FAILURE lies in its careful,
comprehensive, and ultimately quite
convincing marshalling of empirical data
to demonstrate the book's main thesis:
how and why over the past two decades
the US patent system has become
dysfunctional for all but a few actors and
industries. The final two chapters of the
book advocate for numerous reforms to
both patent law and institutions aimed at
alleviating some of the uncertainty that
Bessen and Meurer show increasingly
hobbles the patent system. These
reforms include: strengthening the "nonobviousness" requirement for
patentability (p.236); instituting a
deferential standard of review in the
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~ e d e r dCircuit to patent claim
interpretations made by the PTO (during
the application process) and the federal
district courts (during patent litigation)
(p.237); creating specialized trial-level
patent courts (p.238); requiring patent
applicants to draft clearer patent claims
and permitting the PTO to issue opinion
letters on patent claim interpretation
(pp.230-240); mandating early
publication of patent applications and
eliminating expansive post-application
amendments (pp.242-243); creating
special burdens for the patentability of
most software and business-methods
patents (pp.243-247); increasing the fees
for required renewals of issued patents
(p.247); and strengthening certain
defenses to patent infringement lawsuits
(pp.248-251).
This lengthy list of proposed reforms is
somewhat daunting, which is perhaps
not surprising given the nature and
extent of the problems that PATENT
FAILURE carefully explicates. Bessen
and Meurer are forthright about their
uncertainty that any of the reforms they
advocate will actually work: "We are
sure reform is needed but it is hard to
say how effective any of these reforms
will be or how successful they would be
together at fixing the patent system"
(p.235). Moreover, the authors
recognize the likely formidable political
resistance to reform that might be
expected from powerful actors who
benefit from the current patent system
(e.g., the pharmaceutical industry or the
patent bar) (pp.256-260). Yet they
suggest that political resistance to reform
may recede precisely because the patent
system is increasingly dysfunctional for
even those it currently benefits (p.259)
(not a fully convincing argument) and
that a flexible and data-driven approach

to reform is necessary (which seems
pragmatic and correct).
There is much room to debate whether
the authors make a convincing case for
any particular reform proposal.
Moreover, readers of PATENT
FAILURE may not be sanguine about
the likelihood that Congress or other
policy-makers even care about, much
less rely on, empirical data to inform
their decision-making. But this book
successfully demonstrates that they
should. Ultimately, PATENT FAILURE
is a significant contribution to the
growing literature on the problems and
promise of the US patent system. The
book is at times a challenge to read
because it is so dense with information
and with multiple arguments intended to
bolster and test the authors' main theses.
But PATENT FAILURE rewards careful
reading and is a book that cannot
credibly be ignored by anyone seriously
concerned about the fate of the US
patent system.
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